svb needed to acquire other interest-bearing assets. Since banks make money on the spread between the interest rate they pay on deposits (often nothing) and the rate they are paid by borrowers, having a far larger deposit base than loan book is a problem. Thus svb’s deposits more than quadrupled-from $44bn at the end of 2017 to $189bn at the end of 2021-while its loan book grew only from $23bn to $66bn. They needed to store money more than to borrow. As Silicon Valley boomed over the past five years, so did svb. It also lent to them, which other banks are reluctant to do because few startups have assets for collateral. It opened accounts for them, often before larger lenders would bother. The second is whether its troubles are simply an anomaly, or a harbinger of doom for financial institutions writ large. The first is how svb got into this position. Then came the announcement from the regulators. cnbc, a television network, reported that svb’s capital-raising efforts had failed and that the bank was seeking to sell itself to a larger institution. By the morning of March 10th its shares had slid another 70% or so in pre-market trading, before a halt was called. Bill Ackman, a hedge-fund manager, suggested that the government should bail out the bank. Unpersuaded, some venture capitalists told portfolio companies to run.

Greg Becker, its chief executive, urged clients to “support us as we have supported you”.

Svb’s share price plunged by 60% after the capital raise was revealed.

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